Moldova, a nation of 3.9 million people, will be honored by a visit of the German chancellor Angela Merkel on August 22. Mrs. Merkel, whose interest in solving the 20 years long separatist conflict in Moldova has long been known, is expected to offer in Chișinău, the Moldovan capital, her solutions for the problem.
Most likely, the German “iron lady” will offer Moldova a federalization of German type. This means offering some kind of a constitutional reform that would make Transdniester, a small breakaway enclave that until 1939 had been a part of Soviet Ukraine and has a predominantly Russian and Ukrainian population, to become a sort of “Land” inside federative Moldova.
The plan is expected to fail by most of the analysts, like 90 percent of the EU’s plans for the European Union’s “eastern neighbors.” The reasons for the future failure are the same as for the past ones: simplistic transfer of a West European model to a post-Soviet state and Russophobia. That was the case in Ukraine in 2004-2009, now it is going to be the case in Moldova.
How do these general mistakes express themselves in the Moldovan situation? First, federalization is hardly possible in Moldova, which is badly split between a drive to merge with Romania (a solution advocated by the Romanian-speaking ruling coalition in Chișinău) and stubborn resistance to it of several non-Romanian speaking minorities (Russians, Ukrainians, Turkic-speaking Gagauzes). In this situation, applying a model of a developed West European state to an impoverished country infested with violent nationalisms that led to a bloody war just 20 years ago is unrealistic. Second, Merkel’s plan for Moldova, just like the majority of plans with Western origin, is aimed at sidelining Russia and views Moscow, in general, as a negative influence. Meanwhile, this negative attitude towards Russia is not shared by a large part of Moldova’s population and it is vehemently refuted by the population of Transdniester, which in 2006 voted at a referendum for merging with Russia.
In 1992, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chișinău was rife with rumors about the newly independent Moldova merging with neighboring Romania. Transdniester, a region lying on the opposite bank of the Dniester river from Chișinău, rebelled, since its predominantly Slav population expected bad treatment in Romania, then still an impoverished post-Ceausescu country with a strong nationalist sentiment. The bloody conflict was terminated in August 1992 by the Russian 14th army, which divided the combatants, putting an end to a short, but violent conflict. After the war, the 14th army stayed there as a peacekeeping force, maintaining the heavily fortified barriers between the parties to the conflict, but allowing civilians to travel almost freely between the two sides of the Dniester river .
The problem is that some of the main players in current Moldovan politics (for example, the former acting president and the leader of the Liberal party Mihai Ghimpu, a key figure in the ruling coalition called Alliance for European Integration - AEI) took part in the 1992 events on the side of Romanian-speaking nationalists. The leaders of AEI continue to advocate Moldova’s loss of statehood and its integration into Romania.
“23 years of Russian peacekeepers’ presence on the Dniester river have not taught Chișinău anything”, said Svetlana Gamova, a longtime correspondent of Nezavisimaya Gazeta in the region, a veteran to all political developments in Moldova since 1992. “The problem is that Romania’s constitution defines that country as a unitary state. So, if Moldova integrates Transdniester into itself and then merges with Romania – a perspective advocated by AEI – who will protect the Russian and Ukrainian minorities inside this big new Romania? Moldova’s minorities – not only Transdniester – will never agree to such a development!”
One of the main perks offered by Romania to Moldova if it sheds its statehood and recognizes the power of Bucharest, is the automatic extension of the European Union to the Moldovan territory.
In Gamova’s opinion, Moldova could strive for membership in the EU on its own. “A solution acceptable for everyone would be first to integrate Transdniester into Moldova, and then to make a bid for EU membership for this reunified Moldova,” Gamova said. “Young people in Transdniester want to have the opportunities offered by the EU.”
Russia and the Russian minority in Moldova do not object to the country’s European integration. Transdniester has a new president Yevgeny Shevchuk, who recently ousted the previous president Igor Smirnov at a presidential election (surprise, surprise for the EU – “pro-Russian” Transdniester is a democracy!) Shevchuk established a relatively benign relationship with an equally young prime minister of Moldova, Vladimir Filat. In 2006, Transdniester voted for reunification with Russia at a referendum, but Russia made it clear that it does not want new “colonies.”
“What Russia wants is prosperous neighbors and economic partners, who would help it to fill its coffers and to develop Russian economy,” explains Igor Bunin, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Political Technologies. “Despite all the Western claims to the contrary, Putin is not really an imperialist seeking new territories. His idea of a Eurasian Union is supposed to be a compliment to the European Union, not an alternative to it.”
It is interesting to note that in the period of Transdniester’s de facto independence from Chișinău, Russia never made an attempt to annex this territory. In fact, several times, in 2002 and now, Russia suggested solutions that would make all of Moldova, Transdniester included, a good neighbor and an economic partner of Russia. So, if Mrs. Merkel continues to view Transdniester through anti-Russian binoculars, as the bulk of the Western press unfortunately does, she should better change her optic. Then, may be, even her “federalist” plans will get more realistic.